We consider a ubiquitous scenario in the Internet economy when individual decision-makers (henceforth, agents) both produce and consume information as they make strategic choices in an uncertain environment. This creates a three-way tradeoff between exploration (trying out insufficiently explored alternatives to help others in the future), exploitation (making optimal decisions given the information discovered by other agents), and incentives of the agents (who are myopically interested in exploitation, while preferring the others to explore). We posit a principal who controls the flow of information from agents that came before to the ones that arrive later, and strives to coordinate the agents towards a socially optimal balance between exploration and exploitation, not using any monetary transfers. The goal is to design a recommendation policy for the principal which respects agents' incentives and minimizes a suitable notion of regret. We extend prior work in this direction to allow the agents to interact with one another in a shared environment: at each time step, multiple agents arrive to play a Bayesian game, receive recommendations, choose their actions, receive their payoffs, and then leave the game forever. The agents now face two sources of uncertainty: the actions of the other agents and the parameters of the uncertain game environment.
Introduction
A common phenomenon of the Internet economy is that individual decision-makers (henceforth, agents) both produce and consume information as they make strategic decisions in an uncertain environment. Agents produce information through their selection of actions and the resulting outcomes. 1 Agents consume information from other agents who made similar choices in the past, when and if such information is available, in order to optimize their utilities. The collection and dissemination of information relevant to agents' decisions can be instrumented on a very large scale. Numerous online services do it to provide recommendations concerning various products, services and experiences: movies to watch, products to buy, restaurants to dine in, and so forth.
The main issue of interest for this work is that the agents tend to be myopic, optimizing their own immediate reward, whereas the society would benefit if they also explore new or insufficiently explored alternatives. While the tension between acquisition and usage of information is extremely well-studied (under the name of exploration-exploitation tradeoff ), a crucial new dimension here is the incentives of the agents: since the agents are self-interested, one cannot expect agents to explore only because they are asked to do so. This creates a new intriguing three-way tradeoff between exploration, exploitation and incentives. To study this problem, we introduce a principal, who abstracts the society or a recommendation system, and whose goal is optimize some social objective function such as the social welfare. The principal can control the flow of information from past experiences to the agents, but is not allowed to use monetary transfers. Absent any new information, an agent will only perform the a priori better action, resulting in no exploration. Full transparency -revealing to an agent all information currently known by the principal -is not a good solution, either, because then an agent would only exploit. The goal is to understand how the principal can induce sufficient exploration for achieving near-optimal outcomes.
The prior work on this problem (Kremer et al., 2014; Mansour et al., 2015) has a crucial limitation: given the principal's recommendation, the utility of a given agent is assumed to be unaffected by the choices of other agents. This is often not the case in practice. We lift this restriction, and allow the agents to affect one another. Informally, we posit that the agents operate in a shared environment, and an agent's decision can affect this environment for a limited period of time after the decision is made.
Motivating example. Let us consider a motivating example based on traffic routing. Consider a GPS-based navigation application such as Waze that gives each user a recommended driving route based on the current traffic conditions in the road network (consuming information received from other drivers), and uses his GPS signal to monitor his progress and the traffic conditions along the route (producing information for future recommendations). A natural goal for the navigation system (the "principal" in this example) is to minimize the average delay experienced by the users.
If the application is used by only a few drivers, we can view each user in isolation. However, once the application serves a substantial fraction of drivers in the region, there is a new aspect: recommendations may impact the traffic conditions experienced by other drivers. For example, if the application suggests to all the users in a given region to move to a certain lightly loaded route, then when/if they all follow the recommendation, the route may become highly congested. The uncertainty on how congestion affects delays on various routes can be reduced via exploration.
A natural simplified model for this scenario is that at each round, multiple drivers arrive and interact through a routing game on fixed road network. In this game, the agents simultaneously choose their routes, and the delay at each link is determined by the load: the number of routes that use this link. Typically one assumes a parameterized Bayesian model, where the delay at a particular link is a known function of the load and a vector of parameters. The parameter vector is initially not known, but comes from a known Bayesian prior. Thus, we have a Bayesian game among the drivers. Furthermore, there is a principal that recommends routes to drivers: before each round, it recommends a route to each driver that arrives in this round, and observes the associated delays. Since the drivers are not obliged to follow the recommended routes, the recommendations must be "compatible" with drivers' incentives, in the sense that they must form a correlated equilibrium in the routing game. At each time-step, the principal has a two-pronged goal: to minimize the driving times (exploit) and also to obtain information about the unknown parameters (explore) for the sake of giving better recommendations in the future. The challenge is to find an optimal balance between exploration and exploitation under the constraint that even the exploration must be compatible with drivers' incentives.
Our contributions. We put forward a model, called Bayesian Exploration, which has the following ingredients. Initially, some realized state of nature θ 0 is selected from a known prior distribution, and never changes since then. There are T rounds. In each round, a new set of n agents arrive and play a game (the same game in all rounds): each agent selects an action, and receives utility determined by the joint action and the state θ 0 . There is a single principal which, in each round, recommends an action to each participating agent, and observes the chosen actions and the resulting utilities. The recommendations must be Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC), so that the agents are interested in following them. The principal's utility, a.k.a. reward, is also determined by the joint action and the state θ 0 . The goal of the principal is to maximize her cumulative reward over all rounds, in expectation over the prior (henceforth, expected reward). We consider two versions, depending on whether the utilities are "deterministic" or "stochastic", i.e., whether the utilities of a given joint action are fixed over time (given θ 0 ), or drawn from a fixed distribution.
We design policies for the principal that are near-optimal compared to the best-in-hindsight policy: a BIC policy which maximizes the expected reward for a particular problem instance. In fact, we compete a stronger benchmark: optimal expected reward achieved in any one round by any BIC policy. Our first-order result is a BIC policy whose time-averaged expected reward asymptotically approaches the benchmark. Further, we strive to minimize a version of Bayesian regret: the difference between the benchmark and the expected reward of the principal. Following the literature on regret minimization, we are mainly interested in the asymptotic dependence of regret on the time horizon T . We achieve optimal asymptotic dependence on T : constant for deterministic utilities, and logarithmic for stochastic utilities. 2 The asymptotic constants depend on the Bayesian prior, which appears inevitable because of the BIC constraints. Our policies are computationally efficient: their running time per round is polynomial in the input size.
The stated dependence on T is very non-trivial because the principal faces a game that changes from round to round: namely, the agents' beliefs about the principal depend on the round in which they arrive, because they know that the principal is learning over time. For the sake of argument, consider a modification in which the agents erroneously believe that the principal is not learning. Then the principal plays the same game over and over again, and constant (resp., logarithmic) dependence on T is much easier to obtain.
The major new contribution of our work over (Kremer et al., 2014; Mansour et al., 2015) is the introduction of multiple agents at each round, and considering an interaction through an arbitrary Bayesian game. This additional interaction allows us to abstract a new host of scenarios, and introduces a new level of complexity to the framework. In particular, the principal now has a variety of joint actions it can recommend, and in many cases it has to randomize its recommendation in order maintain incentive-compatibility. (Technically, in each round the principal needs to select a Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2013) , whereas with a single agent in each round it suffices to select a single action, which is a much simpler object.)
Another important feature of our model is that the utilities of the principal may be unaligned with the (cumulative) utility of all agents. For example, the principal may be interested in some form of fairness, such as maximizing the minimum utility in each round. Such objective is very different from the sum of all utilities. At the extreme, the principal might want to minimize the cumulative utility. Interestingly, while the BIC constraint generally limits the principal's ability to harm the agents, the principal may still be able to significantly lower the Bayesian-expected social welfare, compared to the worst Bayes-Nash equilibrium that would exist without the principal. (In fact, this effect can be achieved even in a single round, see Bradonjic et al. (2014) .) This is in stark contrast to the case of single agent per round, where the Bayesian-expected reward of any BIC policy must be at least that of the a-priori best action.
Our policy for stochastic utilities does not need to know the distribution of "noise" added to the utilities. This is somewhat surprising because, for example, one would need to know the noise distribution in order to do a Bayesian update on the noisy inputs. Such detail-free properties are deemed desirable in the economics literature.
Ideas and techniques. One important technical contribution concerns the concept of the explorable joint actions: those that can be explored by some BIC policy in some round with positive probability. In general, not all joint actions are explorable, and the set of explorable joint actions may depend on the state θ 0 . Our high-level approach is to explore all explorable actions. Thus, we face two challenges. First, we need to identify which joint actions are explorable, and explore them. This has to be done inductively, whereby the utilities revealed by exploring one joint action may enable the policy to explore some others, and so forth until no further progress can be achieved. The second challenge is to compute an optimal (randomized) recommendation after all explorable joint actions have been explored, and prove that it outperforms any other BIC policy.
To address these two challenges, we develop the theory of the single-round game in our setting. Termed the recommendation game, it is a generalization of the well-known Bayesian Persuasion game (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) where the signal observed by the principal is distinct from, but correlated with, the unknown state of nature. (Here the principal's signal captures the history observed in the previous rounds.) This generalization allows us to argue about comparative statics: what happens if the principal's signal is modified to contain more information relevant to the state θ 0 . We show that a more informative signal can only improve the optimal reward achievable by the principal, and can only increase the set of "explorable" joint actions.
The "monotonicity-in-information" statements mentioned above (that exploring more joint actions or receiving a more informative signal can only help) are non-trivial and not easy to prove, even if they may seem intuitive. It is worth noting that similar monotonicity-in-information statements in game theory are sometimes intuitive but false (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1986; Kessler, 1998; . More generally, while our algorithms and analyses involve many notions, steps and statements that seem intuitive, formalizing these intuitions required a multi-layered framework to reason about Bayesian Exploration in precise terms. Building up this framework has been a major part of the overall effort.
With stochastic utilities, we have an additional obstacle: the deviations between the expected utilities and our estimates thereof, albeit small and low-probability, may distort agents' incentives. Moreover, the number of different possible observations from the same joint action becomes exponential in the number of rounds, which blows up the running time if we use the techniques from the deterministic case without modifications. To side-step these obstacles, our analysis carefully goes back and forth between the original problem instance and the corresponding problem instance with deterministic utilities.
Additional contribution: single agent per round. Our "algorithmic characterization" of all explorable joint actions is an important contribution even for the case of single agent per round. While Kremer et al. (2014) ; Mansour et al. (2015) provide necessary and sufficient conditions when there are only two actions, for multiple actions Mansour et al. (2015) only give a sufficient condition which is far from necessary. Our work rectifies the situation and provides an explicit algorithm -in fact, an explicit BIC policy -to identify all explorable joint actions.
Additional motivating examples. The essential features of Bayesian Exploration -the tradeoff between exploration, exploitation and incentives, and presence of multiple agents in a shared environment -arise in a variety of scenarios, in addition to the routing scenario described above.
One scenario concerns coordinating participants in a market. Consider sellers that are selling tickets for a particular sports event on an online platform such as StubHub. Implicitly, these sellers are involved in a game where they set the prices and the buyers can select which tickets to buy. A principal (the same platform or a third party) can suggest to the sellers how to set the prices so as to optimize the sellers' combined revenue or other notion of social optimality. The principal learns about the demand of the buyers (through exploration) in order to help the sellers to set the right prices. The price recommendations need to be incentive-compatible because the sellers need to be convinced to follow them.
Another scenario concerns optimizing a shared access to a computing resource. For a simple example, consider a university data center shared by the faculty members, where each user can specify the machine to run his jobs on. The principal can collect the information from multiple users, so as to learn their typical resource requirements, and recommend which machines they should connect to. As a non-critical component, such recommendation system would be easier to maintain compared to a scheduler which enforces the same resource allocation, e.g., it can be ignored when/if it malfunctions.
A third scenario addresses a congestion game in which the agents are incentivized towards homophily. Consider a population of individuals choosing which experience to attend in the near future (e.g., go to a movie, watch a video on Youtube, read a news article, or attend a sports event). Often people are interested not only in the inherent quality of the experience, but also in sharing it with a particular group. This group may be quite large, e.g., it could include many people that share the same demographic, political views, general tastes, etc. Thus, one could imagine a recommendation service that would coordinate people towards sharing the experiences they would like with the people that they would want to share them with. Such recommendation service would need to explore to learn people's tastes, and be compatible with people's incentives.
Related Work
The study of "incentivizing exploration" was initiated by Kremer et al. (2014) . They introduced a version of Bayesian Exploration with only two actions and without strategic interactions between agents, i.e., with a single agent in each round. They provide an optimal policy for deterministic utilities, and a preliminary result for stochastic utilities. Mansour et al. (2015) obtain optimal regret rate for stochastic utilities, as well as a reduction from an arbitrary non-BIC policy to a BIC one. Bimpikis et al. (2018) consider time-discounted utilities. They achieve "first-best" utility if the expected utulity for one of the actions is known. For the general case, they design an optimal but computationally inefficient mechanism, and propose a computationally efficient heuristic. Bahar et al. (2016) enrich the model to allow agents to observe recommendations of their "friends" in a known social network (but restrict to deterministic utilities and networks with a small number of high-degree nodes). Frazier et al. (2014) and Che and Hörner (2018) study related, but technically different problems: in the former, the principal can pay the agents, and the latter consider continuous information flow and a continuum of agents. Mansour et al. (2015) and Frazier et al. (2014) extend their results to multiple actions.
Bayesian Exploration is closely related to three prominent subareas of theoretical economics and machine learning: multi-armed bandits, design of information structures, and strategic learning in games. We briefly survey these connections below.
Multi-armed bandits (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012; Gittins et al., 2011 ) is a well-studied model for exploration-exploitation tradeoff. Absent the BIC constraint, and assuming the agents always follow the recommendations, Bayesian Exploration reduces to the multi-armed bandit problem with stochastic rewards, with action set A and rewards equal to the principal's utility. This is a well-understood problem, with optimal regret-minimizing algorithms and matching lower bounds (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Auer et al., 2002a,b) .
The recommendation game (a single round of Bayesian Exploration) is a version of the Bayesian Persuasion game (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) with multiple agents, where the signal observed by the principal is distinct from, but correlated with, the unknown "state". Our analysis of this game contributes to the line of work on Bayesian Persuasion and, more generally, on the design of information structures, see (Bergemann and Morris, 2016; Taneva, 2016) for background and references, and Dughmi and Xu (2016) for a more algorithmic perspective. Our notion of BIC constitutes (an appropriate version of) Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2013) .
A version of our setting with long-lived agents and no principal to coordinate them has been studied in (Bolton and Harris, 1999; Keller et al., 2005) under the name strategic experimentation. A vast literature on learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) posits reasonable learning dynamics for the agents, as a proxy for their strategic behavior, and studies convergence to a given solution concept (e.g., an equilibrium).
Exploration-exploitation problems with self-interested agents arise in several other scenarios: dynamic pricing (e.g., Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003; Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Badanidiyuru et al., 2018) , dynamic auctions (e.g., Athey and Segal, 2013; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2010; Kakade et al., 2013) , pay-per-click ad auctions (e.g., Babaioff et al., 2014; Devanur and Kakade, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015) , as well as human computation (e.g., Ho et al., 2016; Ghosh and Hummel, 2013; Singla and Krause, 2013 In each round t, the principal recommends a joint action to the agents. Specifically, the round proceeds as follows: a fresh set of n agents arrives; the principal recommends a joint action a ∈ A; each agent i only observes his recommended action a i ; the agents choose their actions in the simultaneous game, and the utilities are realized. The principal observes the chosen actions and the realized utilities. Agents know the t, but do not observe the previous rounds.
The principal commits to an algorithm π that proceeds in rounds, so that in each round it outputs a joint action, and then inputs the chosen actions and the realized utilities. This algorithm is called the iterative recommendation policy.
We will now define the incentive-compatibility constraint. Let π t be the joint action recommended by π in round t; we interpret it as a random variable taking values in A. Let E t−1 be the event that the agents have followed principal's recommendations up to (but not including) round t. Here and henceforth, we will use a standard game-theoretic notation: we will represent a joint action a ∈ A as a pair (a i , a −i ), where i is a agent, a i ∈ A is its action, and a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) is the joint action of all other agents; we will sometimes write (a i , a −i ; θ) to denote the pair (a, θ), where θ ∈ Θ is a state. We will write A −i for the set of all possible a −i 's. In particular, π t −i ∈ A −i denotes the joint action of all other agents chosen by policy π in round t. 
where a i , a In words, suppose agent i is recommended to play action a i in a given round t. Assume that all agents followed the recommendations in the previous rounds, and that all agents but i follow the recommendations in round t. Then agent i cannot improve his conditional expected utility (given the information available to this agent) by choosing a different action a
The goal of the policy is to optimize the expected reward, as defined by the reward function f , subject to the BIC constraint. Throughout, we assume that the agents follow recommendations of a BIC iterative recommendation policy, so that the expected reward is well-defined.
Discussion. One can consider a more general version in which the principal can send arbitrary messages to agents. However, the restriction of messages to recommended actions is without loss of generality (see the discussion in Section 4.1).
One natural reward function f is social welfare, i.e., the sum of utilities of all agents in this round. However, we allow for an arbitrary notion of principal's utility.
Utility structure and time horizon. We define the utility structure U to be a tuple that consists of the action set A, the state space Θ, the prior ψ, the utility functions (u 1 , . . . , u n ), and the reward function f . Note that U completely determines the simultaneous game. A problem instance of Bayesian Exploration consists of U and time time horizon T . Stochastic utilities. We allow a more general version, termed Bayesian Exploration with stochastic utilities. Given the joint action a ∈ A and state θ = θ 0 , the vector of all realized utilities is drawn independently from some distribution D (a,θ) over such vectors, so that the expected utility of each agent i and the principal are, respectively, u i (a, θ) and f (a, θ). All realized utilities lie in [0, 1] . 3 The special case when the realized utilities are always equal to their expectations is termed Bayesian Exploration with deterministic utilities.
Each distribution D (a,θ) is determined by the utility tuple
(We use this assumption to prove Lemma 6.1.) We assume that the mapping from utility tuples U (a,θ) to distributions D (a,θ) is known to the agents, so that they can form Bayesian posteriors. Whether this mapping is known to the mechanism is irrelevant to our results. A problem instance of Bayesian Exploration with stochastic utilities consists of the utility structure U , time horizon T , and the distributions D (a,θ) , (a, θ) ∈ A × Θ.
Computational model. Our results include bounds on the per-round running time of our algorithms. These bounds assume infinite-precision arithmetic (infinite-precision arithmetic operations can be done in unit time), and continuous random seed (a number can be drawn independently and uniformly at random from the unit interval in unit time). Such assumptions are commonly used in theoretical computer science to simplify exposition.
From the computational point of view, an iterative recommendation policy inputs the utility structure. We assume the utilities are represented generically, as a (n + 1) × |A| × |Θ| table. We obtain per-round running times that are polynomial in the input size.
Statement of the main results
For ease of presentation, we will assume that every BIC iterative recommendation policy π is welldefined and BIC for all rounds t ∈ N. This is without loss of generality; e.g., one can extend π by setting π t = π T for all rounds t > T . The extended policy is BIC for the infinite time horizon as long as the original policy π is BIC for the original time horizon T .
Given an iterative recommendation policy π, let
denote the expected reward of π in a given round t. Here the expectation is taken over the realized state θ 0 , the internal randomness in π, and possibly the noise in the rewards. Let REW(π) = T t=1 REW t (π t ) be the cumulative expected reward over all rounds. Deterministic utilities. We compete with all BIC iterative recommendation policies with infinite time horizon; the class of all such policies is denoted Π BIC . Our benchmark is the best expected reward achieved in any one round by any policy in a given policy class Π:
Our main result is a BIC policy whose time-averaged expected reward is close to OPT(Π BIC ). 
where C is a constant that depends only on the utility structure, but not on the time horizon T . The per-round running time of π is polynomial in the generic input size.
In words, Bayesian regret of our policy with respect to policy class Π BIC (i.e., the left-hand side of (3)) is at most a constant as a function of T .
Stochastic utilities. Our results for stochastic utilities compete against a slightly restricted class of BIC policies. For a given parameter δ > 0, a policy is called δ-BIC if it satisfies a stronger version of Definition 3.1 in which right-hand side of (1) is δ rather than 0. 4 The class of all such policies is denoted Π δ . We construct a BIC policy whose time-averaged expected reward is close to OPT(Π δ ). 
where C δ is a constant that depends only on the utility structure and the parameter δ, but not on the time horizon T . The per-round running time of π is polynomial in the generic input size. Policy π does not input the parameterized utility distributions
Bayesian regret of our policy with respect to policy class Π δ (i.e., the left-hand side of (4)) is at most logarithmic in T . The "prior-dependent" constant C δ is in line with prior work on Bayesian Exploration: e.g., all results in Mansour et al. (2015) (which are for the special case of single agent per round) have similar "prior-dependent" constants. (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Auer et al., 2002a) . Our proof connects a negative result for bandits from Lai and Robbins (1985) and a positive result for Bayesian Exploration from Mansour et al. (2015) .
Remark 3.4. We prove that the O(log T ) regret rate in Theorem 3.3 is essentially optimal for Bayesian Exploration with stochastic utilities, even with a single agent per round and only two actions; see Section 8 for detalis. This is in line with the fact that O(log T ) regret rate is optimal in multi-armed bandits

Discussion of the benchmarks
Recall that our generic benchmark OPT(Π) considers the optimal reward in any one round, and does not have a built-in time horizon. Therefore, it is at least as strong as the optimal time-averaged reward for the same policy class:
While OPT ave (Π) can be achieved by some policy in Π (up to an arbitrarily small precision), this is not trivially the case for OPT(Π). However, our theorems imply that these two benchmarks are equal: for deterministic rewards with Π = Π BIC , and for stochastic rewards with Π = Π δ , δ > 0.
Our benchmarks OPT(Π BIC ) and OPT(Π δ ) are, in general, weaker than the best fixed action benchmark -the expected reward of the best action -which is a standard benchmark in the work on multi-armed bandits. In our notation, the best fixed action benchmark is determined by the utility structure U and is in expectation over the prior:
BIC policies cannot match the best fixed action because not all actions are explorable, and even explorable actions are not necessarily implementable with high probability by a BIC policy. We know, however, that the benchmark OPT(Π BIC ) for deterministic utilities does reduce to the best fixed action in the special case when there is a single agent per round and the principal's reward coincides with the agent's utility, as long as all actions are explorable (see Corollary 5.6). 5 Our benchmark for deterministic utilities can be characterized as follows: OPT(Π BIC ) is the maximal per-round expected reward of a BIC policy that has access to the utilities of all explorable joint actions, see Theorem 5.5 for a precise statement.
Warm-up and tools
As a warm-up, let us consider the version with deterministic utilities, and focus on a relatively simple scenario when a BIC iterative recommendation policy explores all joint actions, and then exploits (in the sense that we make precise later). We show that this policy can achieve optimal perround performance once all joint actions are explored. Recall that our benchmark is OPT(Π BIC ), where Π BIC is the class of all BIC iterative recommendation policies, and OPT(·) is defined in (2).
Lemma 4.1. Consider Bayesian Exploration with deterministic utilities. Let π be a BIC iterative recommendation policy that explores all joint actions by a fixed time T π ≤ T . Then there exists a BIC policy π ′ which coincides with π before round T π , and achieves expected reward at least
While very intuitive, this result is surprisingly technical to prove from scratch. Essentially, one needs to specify what "exploitation" means in this context, and argue that this notion of exploitation is BIC and can only benefit from having full information about the utility structure. Thus, we develop a framework to reason about this, which will be an essential toolbox throughout the paper. More specifically, we define and analyze a game which captures a single round of Bayesian Exploration, and formulate a framework to combine BIC "subroutines" into a BIC iterative recommendation policy. A proof of Lemma 4.1 using these tools is in the very end of this section.
While Lemma 4.1 relies on the ability to explore all joint actions, this ability is not guaranteed. This can be seen even in the special case of a single agent per round and only two actions. For this special case, Kremer et al. (2014) and Mansour et al. (2015) present necessary and sufficient conditions under which all actions are explorable, as well as simple examples when these conditions fail. Mansour et al. (2015) also provides sufficient conditions for the version with a single agent per round and an arbitrary number of actions.
The recommendation game: a single round of Bayesian Exploration
We view a single round of Bayesian Exploration as a stand-alone game between the principal and the agents, termed the recommendation game. Here the principal observes an auxiliary "signal", which represents the information received in the previous rounds (and possibly also the internal random seed). Then the principal recommends a joint action, and the agents choose their actions.
Formally, the recommendation game is a version of the Bayesian Persuasion game (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) with multiple agents. Unlike the original Bayesian Persuasion game, in our version the signal observed by the principal is distinct from (but correlated with) the state.
Game specification. For a problem instance of Bayesian Exploration with a given utility structure, the corresponding recommendation game proceeds as follows:
• the state θ 0 is drawn from a Bayesian prior distribution ψ over Θ;
• the principal observes a signal S, then recommends action a i ∈ A i for each agent i;
• the agents choose their actions in the simultaneous game;
• the principal and the agents receive utilities according to the utility structure.
Signal S is an arbitrary random variable with finite support X (the elements of X are called feasible signals). The signal can be correlated with the state: formally, S and θ 0 are random variables on the same probability space. The signal structure associated with S is the tuple (Θ, X , ψ * ), where ψ * is the joint distribution of (S, θ 0 ). The utility structure and the signal structure are common knowledge. The realized state θ 0 is not revealed to the principal (other than through the signal S). Each agent i only observes his own recommendation a i ; it does not observe the state θ 0 , the signal S, or the other recommendations
The principal commits to a recommendation policy: a randomized mapping π : X → A, which takes as input a feasible signal and outputs an action for each agent. The corresponding incentivecompatibility constraint is defined as follows:
Definition 4.2. Given signal S, a recommendation policy π is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if for each agent i ∈ [n] and any two distinct actions
In words, whenever agent i is recommended to play some action a i , he could not improve his expected utility (given the information available to this agent, and assuming that all other agents follow the recommendations) by choosing a different action a ′ i . We assume that the agents follow the recommendations of a BIC policy, so that the expected reward is well-defined.
For the recommendation game, the distinction between stochastic and deterministic utilities is unimportant (for statements that only involve expected utilities and rewards). In particular, a given recommendation policy is BIC for stochastic utilities if and only if it is BIC for the corresponding problem instance with deterministic utilities.
An important special case is the empty signal, defined as a signal which always takes the same value. Such signal will be denoted as S = ⊥.
For the computational results, we assume that the joint distribution of (S, θ 0 ) is given explicitly, as a |X | × |Θ| table of probabilities.
Relation to Bayesian Exploration. Consider an iterative recommendation policy π. W.l.o.g., the internal random seed ω of policy π is chosen once, before the first round, and persists throughout. Let H t be the history up to round t: the chosen joint actions and the realized utilities over all past rounds. Then policy π can be represented as a sequence (π (t) : t ∈ N), where for each round t, π (t) is a randomized mapping from S t = (ω, H t ) to joint actions (called the restriction of π to round t). Each round t can be seen as a recommendation game with signal S t , and π (t) is a recommendation policy in this game. It is easy to see that π is BIC if and only if π (t) is BIC for all t.
Discussion. The notion of Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in the recommendation game is closely connected to the notion of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2013) : modulo the differences in terminology, the former is a special case in which the agents do not receive private signals. In particular, it follows that a BIC recommendation policy always exists.
One can consider a more general version of the recommendation game in which the principal can send arbitrary messages to agents. Then the principal commits to a messaging policy: a randomized mapping which inputs the signal S and outputs a message m i for each agent i. However, such messaging policies can without loss of generality be restricted to recommendation policies. More precisely, suppose a messaging policy τ induces a Bayes Nash Equilibrium ρ (which, in our notation, is a randomized mapping that inputs the joint message (m 1 , . . . , m n ) and outputs a joint action a ∈ A). Then the composition ρ ⊕ τ is a randomized mapping that inputs signal S and outputs a joint action, i.e., a recommendation policy. According to Bergemann and Morris (2013) , this composition is BIC. 6 Thus, the principal can use ρ ⊕ τ instead of τ.
Properties of the recommendation game
Multiple signals. Throughout, we consider a fixed utility structure U , but allow the signal S to vary from one game instance to another. We will suppress U from our notation, but explicify the dependence on S. To study how the properties of a game depend on a particular signal S, we consider multiple signals such that the signals and the realized state θ 0 are random variables in the same probability space; such signals will be called coupled. While each of these signals corre-sponds to a separate game instance (with a shared θ 0 ), we will refer to all these game instances jointly as recommendation game with coupled signals.
Optimality. Given a recommendation policy π for signal S, its expected reward is
The expectation is over the joint distribution of signal S and realized state θ 0 , and the internal randomness in policy π. The optimal reward given signal S is defined as
Thus, it is the largest expected reward achievable in a recommendation game with signal S. 7 A BIC policy π in this game will be called optimal for
LP representation. We will represent the problem of finding an optimal recommendation policy π as a linear program (henceforth, LP). We represent π as a set of numbers x a,s = Pr[π(s) = a], for each joint action a ∈ A and each feasible signal s ∈ X . These numbers, termed the LP-representation of π, will be the decision variables in the LP. The linear program is as follows: 
Monotonicity in information.
We prove that REW * [S] can only increase if signal S becomes more informative. To make this statement formal, we consider a recommendation game with coupled signals S, S ′ . We give a definition that compares the two signals in terms of their "state-relevant" information content, and state the "monotonicity-in-information" lemma (proved in Section 7). 7 We write REW * [S] rather than REW * (S) to emphasize that the optimal reward is a function of the random variable S, rather than a function of a particular realization of this random variable. We will use a similar notation function [S] for some other functions of signal S as well, e.g., for the polytope BIC [S] .
8 For a particular agent i and actions a i , a ′ i ∈ A i , the BIC constraint in Definition 4.2 states that Pr 
An important special case is when S determines S ′ : S ′ = g(S) for some g : X → X ′ .
Lemma 4.6 (monotonicity-in-information). In a recommendation game with coupled signals S, S ′ , if signal S is at least as informative as S
A recommendation policy π for signal S is also well-defined for signal S ′ that determines S. Formally, π induces a recommendation policy π ′ that inputs S ′ , maps it to the corresponding value of S, and returns π(S). Note that π and π ′ choose the same joint actions, and π is BIC given S if and only if π ′ is BIC given S ′ . Henceforth we identify all such "induced" policies π ′ with π.
Optimality for limited exploration. Let us study a recommendation game with a signal that corresponds to exploring a given (possibly randomized) subset B ⊂ A of joint actions. Formally, the subset B ⊂ A will be a 2 A -valued signal: a signal whose values are subsets of A; e.g., its realization may depend on the realized state θ 0 .
Let us consider the signal which corresponds to exploring all joint actions in B. This signal consists of all relevant utilities, and also includes B itself:
Note that it is a random variable, because it depends on random variables B and θ 0 . Despite a rather complicated definition, S = AllInfo(B) is just a signal in a recommendation game. In particular, we can consider an optimal recommendation policy given this signal. By Corollary 4.4, such policy exists, and its LP-representation (and its expected reward) can be computed in time polynomial in |Θ| · |A| · |support(S)|.
We prove that if a BIC iterative recommendation policy is restricted to joint actions in B, then its expected per-round reward cannot exceed REW * [AllInfo(B)].
Claim 4.7. Consider Bayesian Exploration with stochastic utilities. Let B ⊂ A be a 2 A -valued signal (i.e., a randomized set of joint actions). Let π be a BIC iterative recommendation policy such that before a given round t it can only choose joint actions in
Proof. Consider the recommendation game that corresponds to the t-th round of Bayesian Exploration. Recall that the signal in this game is S t = (ω, H t ), where ω is the internal random seed of policy π, and H t is the history before round t. Then π (t) , the restriction of policy π to round t, is a BIC recommendation policy in this game.
The expected reward of policy π in round t is the same as the expected reward of the restricted policy π (t) , i.e.: REW t (π) = REW(π (t) 
Subroutines and the proof of Lemma 4.1
We design iterative recommendation policies in a modular way, via "subroutines" that comprise multiple rounds and accomplish a particular task. In particular, we need a formal framework to argue that our "subroutines" are BIC if considered separately, and jointly form a BIC policy. We model a "subroutine" as an iterative recommendation policy that inputs the history of the previous rounds and chooses its own duration.
Formally, we consider a common generalization of Bayesian Exploration and the recommendation game: the state θ 0 is drawn and the signal S is observed exactly as in the recommendation game, and then the game proceeds over multiple rounds, exactly as in Bayesian Exploration. Note that the recommendation game is simply a special case with time horizon T = 1.
We focus on a version where the time horizon is infinite (and irrelevant). Instead, each iterative recommendation policy π runs for T π rounds, where the number T π , termed duration, is chosen by the policy rather than given exogenously. The duration is chosen before the signal is observed, and thus can only depend on the utility structure and the signal structure. (This restriction is crucial for proving Claim 4.8.) The notion of BIC carries over word-by-word from Definition 3.1. Iterative recommendation policies in this model will also be called subroutines.
From the computational point of view, the input to a subroutine consists of the utility structure, the signal structure, and the realization of the signal. The output of a subroutine is the tuple (S, H), where H is the history: the chosen joint actions and the rewards/utilities for all rounds in the execution, or any function of (S, H).
A recommendation game and a General Bayesian Exploration game with the same utility/signal structure are called associated. As in Section 4.2, we fix the utility structure, but allow the signal S to vary from one subroutine to another. A subroutine π initialized with a particular feasible signal s will be denoted π(s). Now we can define the composition of subroutines, so that the composition of BIC subroutines is BIC. Consider two subroutines π, π ′ with respective signals S, S ′ . Then the composition of π followed by π ′ , denoted π ⊕ π ′ , is a subroutine with signal S and duration T π + T π ′ . The first T π rounds of π ⊕ π ′ are controlled by π, and the subsequent T π ′ rounds are controlled by π ′ . In order for the composition to be well-defined, the signal for π ′ should be expressed in terms of the output of π. Formally, we say that π ′ is a valid sequel for π if the pair (S, H) determines S ′ , where H is the history of π. A sequence of subroutines (π, π ′ , π ′′ , . . .) is called valid if the every next subroutine is a valid sequel for the previous one. It is easy to see that the composition is associative: π ⊕ (π ′ ⊕ π ′′ ) = (π ⊕ π ′ ) ⊕ π ′′ , so it is uniquely defined by the sequence, and can be denoted π ⊕ π ′ ⊕ π ′′ . Thus, a BIC iterative recommendation policy can be presented as a composition of a valid sequence of subroutines, where the first subroutine inputs an empty signal, and all durations sum up to T .
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let π be the policy from the lemma statement, and let σ be the subroutine of duration T π which coincides with π on the first T π rounds. (In other words, σ is a version of policy π that is "truncated" after round T π .) Let π * be an optimal recommendation policy for signal S = AllInfo(A). Note that REW * [S] ≥ OPT(Π BIC ) by Claim 4.7. Let π ′ be an iterative recommendation policy defined as the composition of σ followed by T − T σ copies of π * . Note that π ′ is BIC by Claim 4.8, and receives expected reward REW * [A] in each round after T π by construction.
Bayesian Exploration with deterministic utilities
In this section, we focus on deterministic utilities, and prove Theorem 3.2. In particular, we will construct a BIC iterative recommendation policy π whose expected reward REW(π) satisfies (3).
Rather We construct a BIC iterative recommendation policy which explores all of A det θ 0 . Note that the existence of such policy does not immediately follow from Definition 5.1, because the definition only guarantees a BIC policy separately for each (θ, a) pair, whereas we need one BIC policy which "works" for the specific (and unknown) realized state θ 0 , and all "matching" joint actions a. A maximally-exploring subroutine can be followed by exploitation, using the corresponding optimal recommendation policy. The resulting BIC iterative recommendation policy achieves the regret bound claimed in Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 5.4. Let σ be a maximally-exploring subroutine of duration T σ . Let π * be an optimal recommendation policy for signal AllInfo(A det θ 0 ). Let π be the composition of subroutine σ followed by T −T σ copies of π * . Then π is a BIC iterative recommendation policy that satisfies
The lemma easily follows from the machinery developed in Section 4. Namely, we use the notion and existence of A det θ 0 -optimal policy (see Corollary 4.4), the "monotonicity-in-information" analysis which guarantees (8), and the "composition of subroutines" analysis which guarantees that π is BIC (via Claim 4.8).
The existence of a maximally-exploring subroutine also allows to characterize the benchmark OPT(Π BIC ) as the maximal per-round expected reward of a BIC policy that has access to the utilities of all explorable joint actions. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we develop the theory of "explorability" in a recommendation game. Then in Section 5.2 we use this theory to define a natural BIC subroutine and prove that this subroutine is maximally-exploring (and has the desired perround computation time). Finally, in Section 5.3 we put it all together to prove Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 5.5.
Explorability in the recommendation game
In this subsection we investigate which joint actions can be explored in the recommendation game. We adopt a very permissive definition of "explorability", study some of its properties, and design a subroutine which explores all such joint actions. Throughout, we consider a recommendation game with signal S whose support is X . for each feasible signal s ∈ X . We will call such π max a max-support policy for signal S. For example, we can set
This policy is BIC as a convex combination of BIC policies, and max-support by design. We compute a max-support policy as follows. For each joint action a ∈ A and each feasible signal s ∈ X , we solve the following LP: [S] , and the output x is the LP-representation of the policy given by (10).
Algorithm 1 ComputeMaxSupport: computes a max-support policy. Input: the utility structure and the signal structure.
Output: an LP-representation of a max-support policy.
For each joint action a ∈ A and feasible signal s ∈ X : solve the linear program (11); let x a,s be a solution with objective value η a,s .
The "quality" of a max-support policy π max is, for our purposes, expressed by the minimal probability of choosing a joint action in its support:
We relate this quantity to the min-max probability in Definition 5.7: Maximal exploration given a signal. Let us design a subroutine σ which explores all signalexplorable joint actions. More specifically, given a recommendation game with signal S, we are looking for a subroutine σ in the associated Generalized Bayesian Exploration game which explores all joint actions in EX [S] . Such subroutine will be called maximally-exploring for signal S.
We start with a max-support policy π max returned by ComputeMaxSupport. Let x max be its LP-representation, so that x max a,s := Pr[π max (s) = a]. Given a particular signal realization s ∈ X , we proceed as follows. We compute the signal-explorable set EX s [S] as the support of π max (s). For each joint action a ∈ EX s [S], we choose the dedicated round τ s (a) when this action is chosen. The dedicated rounds are chosen uniformly at random, in the sense that an injective function τ s :
is chosen uniformly at random among all such functions (where T σ is the duration of the subroutine). To guarantee that the subroutine is BIC, we ensure that
for each round t and joint action a ∈ A.
To this end, for each non-dedicated round the joint action is chosen independently from a fixed distribution D s that is constructed to imply (14). Specifically, we write N s = |EX s [S]| and define:
It is easy to see that D s is a distribution, provided that the duration is large enough. Specifically, it suffices to set T σ = max(1 + N s , ⌈1/p min (π max )⌉). Then for each round t and action a ∈ EX s [S],
where the 1/T σ is the probability that round t is dedicated for action a. This completes the description of the subroutine, and the proof that it is BIC. The computational procedure for this subroutine is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Subroutine MaxExplore: maximal exploration given signal S. Input: utility structure U , signal structure S , and signal realization s ∈ X .
// compute the parameters x ← ComputeMaxSupport(U , S ) // LP-representation of a max-support policy π max B ← {a :∈ A : x a,s > 0} // signal-explorable set 
A maximally-exploring subroutine
We come back to Bayesian Exploration, and strive to explore as many joint actions as possible. We define a natural BIC subroutine for this goal, and prove that it is indeed maximally-exploring. Our BIC subroutine is based on the following intuition. Initially, one can explore some joint actions via "maximal exploration" for an empty signal S 1 = ⊥. This gives some additional observations, so one can now run "maximal exploration" for a new signal S 2 which comprises these new observations. This in turn provides some new observations, and so forth. We stop after |A| iterations, which (as we prove) suffices to guarantee that no further progress can be made.
Formally, the subroutine proceeds in phases ℓ = 1, 2, 3 , . . . , |A|. In each phase, we start with the "current" signal S ℓ , and perform "maximal exploration" given this signal by calling MaxExplore. This call computes the "next" signal S ℓ+1 = AllInfo(EX[S ℓ ]). After the last phase, we outputs the latest signal S |A|+1 which (as we prove) encompasses all observations received throughout the subroutine. Each call to MaxExplore must be parameterized with the signal structure for the corresponding signal S ℓ . Since the signal is uniquely determined by the realized state θ 0 , the signal structure is completely specified by the tuple (S ℓ (θ) : θ ∈ Θ), where S ℓ (θ) is the value of the signal that corresponds to realized state θ 0 = θ. The pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Subroutine RepeatMaxExplore: maximal exploration.
Input: the utility structure U .
Initialize: S 1 = S 1 = ⊥. // "phase-1 signal" is empty
// compute the signal structure S ℓ+1 for signal S ℓ+1 x ← ComputeMaxSupport(U , S ℓ ) // LP-representation of a max-support policy
where
RepeatMaxExplore is BIC as a composition of BIC subroutines. It is easy to see, by induction on phase ℓ, that the realization of signal S ℓ is determined by the state θ 0 . In particular, it follows that the support of each signal S ℓ is of size at most |Θ|. Therefore, the per-round running time is polynomial in |A|· |Θ|, because so is the the running time of ComputeMaxSupport and the per-round running time of MaxExplore. Thus:
Claim 5.11. RepeatMaxExplore is BIC; its per-round running time is polynomial in |A| · |Θ|.
Let B ℓ+1 be the set of all joint actions explored during phase ℓ. For the sake of the argument, let us define B 1 = ∅, and extend the definition of sets B ℓ and signals S ℓ to phases ℓ = 1, 2, 3, . . . (i.e., without an upper bound on the number of phases). By construction, B ℓ+1 = EX[S ℓ ] is a random variable whose realization is determined by the realized state θ 0 , and S ℓ = AllInfo(B ℓ ).
We show that B ℓ+1 is the set of all joint actions explored during the first ℓ phases, and that stopping after |A| phases is without loss of generality:
Claim 5.12. Sets (B ℓ : ℓ ∈ N) are non-decreasing in ℓ, and identical for ℓ ≥ |A| + 1.
Proof. To prove that sets (B ℓ : ℓ ∈ N) are non-decreasing in ℓ, we use induction on ℓ and Lemma 5.8(a) on "monotonicity-in-information". Now, a strictly increasing sequence of subsets of A, starting from an empty set, cannot have more than |A| + 1 elements. It follows that B ℓ = B ℓ+1 for some phase ℓ ≤ |A| + 1. By definition of B ℓ , the sets (B ℓ ′ : ℓ ′ ≥ ℓ) are identical.
Depending on the state θ 0 , some of the later phases may be redundant in terms of exploration, in the sense that B ℓ = B ℓ+1 = . . . = B |A|+1 starting from some phase ℓ. Nevertheless, we use a fixed number of phases so as to ensure that the duration is fixed in advance. (This is required by the definition of a subroutine so as to ensure composability, as per Claim 4.8.)
Lemma 5.13. Subroutine RepeatMaxExplore is maximally-exploring.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary BIC iterative recommendation policy π, and prove that all joint actions explored by π are also explored by RepeatMaxExplore.
Denote the internal random seed in π by ω. Without loss of generality, the ω is chosen once, before the first round, and persists throughout. Let A t be the set of joint actions explored by π in the first t − 1 rounds. It is a random variable whose realization is determined by the random seed ω and realized state θ 0 . Let us represent policy π as a sequence of (π (t) : t ∈ [T ]), where each π (t) is a BIC recommendation policy which inputs signal S * t which consists of the random seed and the observations so far: S * t = (ω, AllInfo(A t )), and is deterministic given that signal. In each round t, the recommended joint action is chosen by policy π (t) ; it is denoted π (t) (S * t ). We will prove the following claim using induction on round t:
For the induction base, consider round t = 1. Then A 1 = ∅, so the signal is simply S * 1 = (ω, ⊥). Note that the empty signal ⊥ is at least as informative as the signal S * 1 . Therefore:
(by Lemma 5.8)
= B 1 (by definition of B 1 ).
For the induction step, assume that (16) holds for all rounds t < t 0 , for some t 0 . Then A t 0 ⊂ B ℓ for some phase ℓ, so signal S ℓ = AllInfo(B ℓ ) for phase ℓ of RepeatMaxExplore is at least as informative as signal S * t 0 = (ω, AllInfo(A t 0 )) for round t 0 of policy π. Therefore:
This completes the proof of (16). Therefore policy π can only explore joint actions in ∪ ℓ∈N B ℓ , and by Claim 5.12 this is just B |A+1| , the set of joint actions explored by RepeatMaxExplore.
Putting this all together: proof of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 5.5
We use the maximally-exploring subroutine RepeatMaxExplore from Section 5.2 (let T 0 denote its duration), and an optimal recommendation policy for signal S = AllInfo(A det θ 0 ), denote it π * .
Let π be the composition of subroutine RepeatMaxExplore followed by T − T 0 copies of π * . By Lemma 5.4, this policy has the reward guarantee claimed in Theorem 3.2.
, which is at least OPT(Π BIC ) by (8). It follows that the supremum in the definition of OPT(Π BIC ) is attained by π ∈ Π BIC . Which implies Theorem 5.5.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.2, let us argue about the computational implementation of π. For brevity, let us say polytime-computable to mean "computable in time polynomial in |A|· |Θ|". We need to prove that each round of π is polytime-computable. Each round of RepeatMaxExplore is polytime-computable by Claim 5.11, and each round of π * is polytime-computable by definition, so it remains to prove that a suitable π * is polytime-computable.
By Corollary 4.4, policy π * is poly-time computable given the signal structure for signal S (because the signal is determined by the realized state θ 0 , and therefore has support of size at most |Θ|). Recall that S = S |A+1| is the signal computed in the last phase of RepeatMaxExplore. So the corresponding signal structure is poly-time computable using a version of RepeatMaxExplore without the calls to MaxExplore. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Bayesian Exploration with stochastic utilities
We turn our attention to stochastic utilities. As we pointed out in Section 3.1, we compete against δ-BIC iterative recommendation policies, for a given δ > 0. 9 We construct a BIC policy whose time-averaged expected reward is close to OPT(Π δ ), where Π δ is the class of all δ-BIC policies.
In fact, we achieve a stronger result. We consider the deterministic instance: a version of the original problem instance with deterministic utilities. For the deterministic instance, let Π det δ be the class of all δ-BIC policies, and let OPT det (·) be the value of OPT(·). Our new benchmark is defined as OPT det (Π det δ ). This is indeed a stronger benchmark:
Proof. Fix δ > 0. Given an arbitrary δ-BIC iterative recommendation policy for the original instance, one can construct an iterative recommendation policy σ such that for the deterministic instance this policy is δ-BIC and achieves the same per-round expected rewards:
The construction is very simple: in each round t of the deterministic instance, π ′ recommends the joint action a = a t selected by policy π, observes the utility tuple U (a,θ 0 ) , draws a "fake" vector of realized utilities from the corresponding distribution D (a,θ 0 ) , and feeds this vector to π. In particular, for each ε > 0 there exists a δ-BIC iterative recommendation policy for the original instance such that E[f (π t , θ 0 )] > OPT(Π δ )−ε for some round t. Taking the corresponding policy σ as above, one sees that
Our main result for stochastic utilities (which implies Theorem 3.3) is stated as follows:
9 Recall that δ-BIC policies satisfy a stronger version of Definition 3.1 in which right-hand side of (1) 
where C is a constant that depends only on the utility structure and the parameter δ, but not on the time horizon T . The per-round running time of π is polynomial in |A| · |Θ|. Moreover, the policy π does not input the parameterized utility distributions D a,θ , (a, θ) ∈ A × Θ.
Our policy (and regret bounds) depend on an important parameter of the utility structure: the minimal amount of separation between the utilities for two states.
Definition 6.3 (separation parameter). The separation parameter is the smallest number ζ > 0 such that for any states θ, θ ′ ∈ Θ, any agent i ∈ [n], and any joint action a ∈ A we have
The main steps in our solution are as follows:
1. We extend some basic tools and concepts of BIC recommendation policies to δ-BIC recommendation policies.
2. We give a useful subroutine that approximates the expected utilities using multiple samples of the stochastic utilities. We show that any δ-BIC recommendation policy for the deterministic instance remains BIC when it inputs approximate utilities instead of the expected utilities, as long as the approximation is sufficiently good.
3. We present a maximally-exploring subroutine, analogous to the one in Section 5, and use it to construct a BIC recommendation policy that achieves logarithmic regret compared to the class of all δ-BIC policies.
Preliminaries: from BIC to δ-BIC
We extend some of the machinery developed in the previous sections to δ-BIC policies. In the interest of space, we sometimes refer to the said machinery rather than spell out the full details. We start with the notions of "eventually-explorable joint action" and "maximally-exploring subroutine". Note that the former only considers the deterministic instance. Let us turn to the recommendation game. For the recommendation game, the distinction between deterministic and stochastic utilities is irrelevant, as far as this paper is concerned, because only the expected utilities matter. (6) 
Definition 6.6. Consider a recommendation game with signal S, and fix δ ≥ 0. Policy π is called δ-BIC if it satisfies a version of Definition 4.2 in which the right-hand side of
The LP-representation of a δ-BIC recommendation policy satisfies a version of the LP from Section 4.2 where the first constraint expresses δ-BIC condition rather than BIC. Specifically, the right-hand side in the first constraint should be changed from 0 to δ · Pr[π i (S) = a i ]. In terms of the LP variables, the right-hand side becomes δ · a −i ∈A −i , s∈I , θ∈Θ ψ(θ) · ψ * (s | θ) · x a,s . The feasible region of the modified LP will be denoted BIC δ [S] .
Claim 6.7. A recommendation policy π is δ-BIC if and only if its LP-representation lies in
We carry over the notion of max-support policies: a δ-max-support policy π max is a δ-BIC recommendation policy π max such that EX 
Approximate deterministic utilities using stochastic utilities
Let us discuss how to to approximate the expected utilities using multiple samples of stochastic utilities, and how to use the resulting approximate signal. In particular, we introduce an important tool (Lemma 6.10): a fact about approximate signals which we use throughout this section.
Notation. Formulating this discussion in precise terms requires some notation. Fix subset B ⊂ A of joint actions. Given state θ, the expected utilities of joint actions in B form a table
Recall that in Section 4.2, full information pertaining to the joint actions in B is expressed as a signal AllInfo(B) = (B, U (B, θ 0 )), as defined in (7). Now, let θ = θ 0 be the realized state. Let an IID utility vector for a joint action a ∈ B be an independent sample from distribution D (a,θ) . Recall from Section 3 that such sample is a random vector in [0, 1] n+1 whose expectation is U (a, θ) .
, where each v(a, j) is an IID utility vector for the corresponding joint action a. We would like to use the sample U B to approximate U (B, θ).
Approximation procedure. Our approximation procedure is fairly natural. We input a d-sample U B for some subset B ⊂ A. Then we compute average utilities across the d samples:
Then we map these averages to the state θ which provides the best fit for the averages:
where the ties are broken uniformly at random (any fixed tie-breaking rule would suffice).
We will represent the output of this procedure as a signal DeNoise(U B ) = B, U (B, θ) . Note that such signal has the same structure as the "correct" signal AllInfo(B), in the sense that DeNoise(U B ) ∈ support(AllInfo(B)), so we can directly compare the two signals.
Properties of the approximation. First, we observe that the approximate signal DeNoise(U B ) is exactly equal to the correct signal AllInfo(B) with high probability, as long as the number of samples is large compared to log(n |B|) and the inverse of the separation parameter ζ. 
(This is an easy consequence of Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound, see Appendix A).
The crucial point here is that DeNoise(U B ) can be used instead of AllInfo(B) in the recommendation game. More specifically, if π be a δ-BIC recommendation policy for signal AllInfo(B), then it is also a BIC recommendation policy for signal DeNoise(B), as long as the approximation parameter β is sufficiently small compared to the minimal probability p min (π).
Lemma 6.10. Consider the setting of Lemma 6.9. Let π be a δ-BIC recommendation policy for signal AllInfo(B). Then π is also a BIC recommendation policy for signal DeNoise(B), as long as
We derive Lemma 6.10 as a corollary of a general fact about approximate signals in a recommendation game, which we develop in the next subsection.
Approximate signals in a recommendation game
We abstract (17) as a property of two coupled signals, and state the corresponding generalization of Lemma 6.10. 
where the randomness is taken over the realization of (S, S ′ , θ 0 ).
Lemma 6.12. Consider the setting of Definition 6.11. Let π be a δ-BIC recommendation policy for signal S. Then π is also a BIC recommendation policy for signal S ′ , as long as β ≤ δ · p min (π)/2|X |.
As an intermediate step, we will show the following technical lemma.
Lemma 6.13. Consider the setting of Definition 6.11. Let g be a random variable in the same probability space as (S, S ′ , θ 0 ), with bounded range [0, H] . Then
Proof. Let E denote the event of (S = S ′ ), which occurs with probability at least 1 − β by definition. We will also write ¬E to denote the event of (S S ′ ), and we know Pr[¬E] ≤ β. Observe that the event (S ′ = s) ∧ E is equivalent to the event (S = s) ∧ E. Also note that g ∈ [0, H], so for each s ∈ X , we could write
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.12. For any agent i ∈ [n] and any joint action a ∈ A, the utility u i (a, θ) is a random variable with bounded range [0, 1]. In particular, we obtain (18) for random variable g = u i (a, θ 0 ). Let x be the LP-representation of policy π from the lemma statement. Pick some action a i ∈ A i such that Pr[π i (S) = a i ] > 0, and some other action a
where a −i ∈ A −i is a joint action of all agents but i. Then
To show that policy π is a BIC policy for signal S ′ , it suffices to show that E [W (π −i (S) | π i (S) = a i ] is non-negative, and we could write
(by our assumption of Lemma 6.10) Therefore, we know that π is BIC w.r.t. the signal S.
A δ-maximally-exploring subroutine under stochastic utitlities
In this subsection, we will give our maximal exploration algorithm (with access to stochastic utilities) for exploring all the joint actions explorable by any δ-strictly BIC policy (with access to deterministic utitlities). Our BIC subroutine is largely similar to the one in Section 5.2 except that our recommendation policy will only have access to approximate signals based on stochastic utilities. We will first introduce a BIC subroutine MaxExplore δ that given an approximation signalŜ to the signal S, explores all the joint actions in the set A ′ = EX δ [S] . In the process, the subroutine will collect multiple utility samples of each explored joint action, which will allow us to construct a new signal approximation for the signal AllInfo(A ′ ).
Algorithm 4 Subroutine MaxExplore δ (U , S ,Ŝ, β, β ′ ): maximal exploration given an approximate signalŜ.
Input: the utility structure U , the signal structure S with associated signal S,Ŝ as a β-signal approximation to S with β being the input signal confidence parameter, and the confidence parameter for output signal β ′ // compute the parameters let s ∈ X be the realization of signalŜ Note that if our algorithm has access to deterministic utilities, in the end it will be able to construct a signal AllInfo(B), where B is the (random) set of actions explored by the algorithm. We now show that even though our algorithm only has access to stochastic utilities, the output signal will be a β-signal approximation to AllInfo(B). Proof. Fix any state θ as our true state θ 0 . First, we know that with probability at least 1 − β over the randomness of S andŜ, we have S =Ŝ. We will condition on this event, which is the case except with probability β. This means the subroutine will explore the same subset of joint actions: B = EX δ S [S] . Then, the stated result simply follows from the accuracy guarantee of DeNoise (Lemma 6.9).
We now formally introduce our δ-maximally exploring subroutine. Similar to RepeatMaxExplore, it will proceed in phases ℓ = 1, 2, 3, . . . , |A|. In each phase ℓ, we will use the approximate signal S β ℓ to perform maximal exploration by instantiating the function MaxExplore δ . This in turn will allow us to construct an approximate signal for the next phase. See Algorithm 5 for details of the parameters.
Algorithm 5 Subroutine RepeatMaxExplore δ (U , β): δ-maximal exploration.
Input: the utility structure U and confidence parameter β Initialize:
Output: final signalŜ |A|+1 Finally, we will show that RepeatMaxExplore δ is δ-maximally exploring and outputs a β approximate signal for AllInfo(A δ θ ).
Lemma 6.17. The subroutine RepeatMaxExplore δ is δ-maximally-exploring with probability at least 1 − β over the randomness of the stochastic utilities, and outputs a signalŜ |A|+1 that is a β-signal approximation to AllInfo(A δ θ 0 ).
Proof. Fix any game state θ as our true state θ 0 . Let π be any δ-BIC iterative recommendation policy with access to deterministic utilities. Our goal is to show that all actions explored by π are also explored by RepeatMaxExplore δ with probability at least 1 − β. Note that in each phase ℓ of the RepeatMaxExplore δ , we know by Lemma 6.15 that except with probability at most β ′ over the randomness of the stochastic utilities, the output signal satisfieŝ
For the remainder of the proof, we will condition on this event over all phases of RepeatMaxExplore δ , which by union bound occurs with probability at least 1 − |A|β ′ = 1 − β.
Denote the internal random seed in π by ω. We will think of ω being drawn ahead of first round of our Bayesian exploration game and fixed throughout the game. Let A t be the set of actions explored by π in the first (t − 1) rounds, which is determined by the realization of ω and the true state θ 0 (since π sees deterministic utitlities). We will represent π as a sequence of π (t) : t ∈ [T ] , where each π (t) is a BIC recommendation policy which inputs the signal S * t which consists of the random seed and the observations so far: S * t = (ω, AllInfo(A t )), and is determined given that signal. In each round t, we will denote the recommended joint action by π (t) (S * t ). We will prove the following claim using induction on round t:
where B ℓ is the random set of joint actions explored by the algorithm RepeatMaxExplore δ in phase ℓ.
For the base case (t = 1), we know that A 1 = ∅, so the signal S * 1 = (ω, ⊥). Since the random seed is independent of the game state, we know that the empty signal (⊥) is at least as informative as the signal S * 1 . This means
For the induction step, assume that (19) holds for all rounds t < t 0 , for some t 0 ∈ N. This implies A t 0 ⊆ B ℓ for some phase ℓ of RepeatMaxExplore δ , and so the signalŜ ℓ is at least as informative as the signal S * t = (ω, AllInfo(A t 0 )). It follows that
This gives a proof for the claim in 19. By the same reasoning of Claim 5.12, the (B ℓ : ℓ ∈ N) are non-decreasing in ℓ, and identical for all ℓ ≥ |A| + 1, so we have shown that all joint actions explored by π must be contained in B |A|+1 . It follows that RepeatMaxExplore δ is δ-maximally exploring given access to stochastic utitlities, andŜ ℓ+1 = AllInfo(A δ θ 0 ).
Putting this all together: proof of Theorem 3.3
Lastly, we will show how the δ-maximal exploration subroutine will lead to a near-optimal iterative recommendation policy. As an intermediate step, we show that if an exploration subroutine outputs an approximate signal for AllInfo(A δ θ 0 ), we can then obtain close to optimal rewards.
Lemma 6.18. Let δ, β ∈ (0, 1/2) and σ be a δ-maximally exploring subroutine with duration T σ that outputs a β-signal approximationŜ to the signal S * = AllInfo(A δ θ ). Let π * be an optimal δ-BIC recommendation policy for signal S * , and π be the composition of subroutine σ followed by T −T σ copies of π * (Ŝ). Then π is BIC as long as β ≤ δ/(2C|Θ|), and has reward
Proof. First, we know that there exists some constant C > 0 such that p min (π * ) ≥ 1/C. Furthermore, we know that the number of realizations for the signal S * is at most the number of states |Θ|. It follows from Lemma 6.10 that π * ∈ BIC(Ŝ), and since σ is BIC, we also have that π is BIC by Claim 4.8.
In the following, we will write s * andŝ to denote the realization of signals S * andŜ respectively, and use ψ * to denote the joint distribution over the two signals S * ,Ŝ and the state θ. By the definition of β-signal approximation in Definition 6.11, we have for each θ ∈ Θ,
For t > T σ , we can write the reward at round t as
since the reward is fully determined by the state and the randomness of π. In particular, for each θ ∈ Θ, we have E
In other words,
Note that we also have REW * [S * ] ≥ OPT det (Π det δ ) by Claim 4.7. Therefore, in the last (T −T σ ) rounds, the expected reward of π is at least (
To establish the result in Theorem 3.3, we will instantiate RepeatMaxExplore δ (U , β) as our δ-maximally exploring subroutine and works out the duration T σ 's dependence on the confidence parameter β.
Recall that RepeatMaxExplore δ consists of a total number of |A| phases, and in each phase it instantiates the subroutine MaxExplore δ with output signal approximation parameter β ′ = β/|A|, which takes ln(1/β) poly(|A|, |Θ|) rounds, where poly denotes some polynomial on two variables. It follows that RepeatMaxExplore δ (U , β) also has duration at most ln(1/β) poly(|A|, |Θ|) number of rounds.
Therefore, if we instantiate σ = RepeatMaxExplore δ with confidence parameter β = 1/T and followed by the optimal policy π * for the signal S * = A δ θ for the remaining T − T σ rounds, the total reward of π satisfies
where C is some constant depending on the prior and game specification. This recovers our stated bound of Theorem 3.3.
Monotonicity in information: formulations and proofs
In this section we consider a recommendation game with coupled signals, and prove the following lemma which unifies Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 5.8. We state this lemma for δ-BIC policies, as it is also used for stochastic utilities in Section 6.
Lemma 7.1 (monotonicity-in-information). Consider a recommendation game with coupled signals S, S ′ such that S is at least as informative than S
with probability 1.
Throughout this section, signals S, S ′ are as in Lemma 7.1, and X , X ′ are their respective supports. All expectations are over the random choice of (S, S ′ , θ 0 ), and also the internal randomness of recommendation policies (if applicable).
We will use the notion of "at least as informative" via the following corollary:
Given a policy π ′ for signal S ′ , one can define the induced policy π for signal S by setting
We use Claim 7.2 to derive a more elaborate technical property: essentially, that policies π and π ′ are equivalent when applied to any given function of h : A × Θ → R.
Claim 7.3. Let π ′ be an arbitrary recommendation policy for signal S ′ , and let π be the induced policy for signal S. Then for any function h :
Proof. Fix a feasible signal s ∈ X . Assume for now that policy π ′ is deterministic. Then for any joint action a ∈ X we have
Therefore,
Taking expectations over the realizations of signal S, we obtain the lemma (namely, (20)) for the special case when policy π ′ is deterministic. For a randomized policy π ′ , we obtain the lemma by taking expectation over all possible realizations of π ′ .
We use Claim 7.3 in two ways: to argue about the rewards and to argue about BIC.
Corollary 7.4. Let π ′ be a policy for signal S ′ , and let π be the induced policy for signal S.
Proof. For part (a), simply use Claim 7.3 with function h(a, θ) = f (a, θ). For part (b), fix agent i and any two actions a i ,ã i ∈ A i . Let us use the following shorthand:
Use Claim 7.3 with function
It follows that
The right-hand side of this equation is greater or equal to δ because policy π ′ is δ-BIC for signal S ′ . Since this holds for any agent i and any two actions a i ,ã i ∈ A i , the induced policy π is δ-BIC, too.
Proof of Lemma 7.1. To prove that REW * [S] ≥ REW * [S ′ ], let π ′ be an optimal policy for signal S ′ , and π be the corresponding induced policy for signal S. Then by Corollary 7.4 it follows that policy π is BIC and has the same expected reward; therefore,
, let π ′ be a δ-max-support policy for signal S ′ , and π be the corresponding induced policy for signal S. Policy π is δ-BIC by Corollary 7.4(b). Moreover, for all feasible signals s ∈ X , s ′ ∈ X ′ such that Pr[S ′ = s ′ | S = s] > 0 we have:
It follows that EX[S] ⊃ EX[S ′ ], as claimed.
Lower bound for stochastic utilities
Let us argue that the O(log T ) regret rate in Theorem 3.3 is essentially optimal for Bayesian Exploration with stochastic utilities. We draw on the logarithmic lower bound in multi-armed bandits, a well-known result that dates back to Lai and Robbins (1985) . 10 We start with a simpler formulation of our lower bound: 
for infinitely many rounds t and any δ ∈ (0, δ 0 ).
A stronger and more informative result (Theorem 8.4, which implies Theorem 8.1) is formulated and proved later in this section, preceded by some background and discussion.
Background and discussion
Lower bounds in bandits. On a high level, a lower bound on regret in a multi-armed bandit problem asserts that a given family F of problem instances is "hard" for any algorithm. A precise statement of such result can take one of the following three forms found in the literature:
(i) any algorithm incurs high expected regret on some problem instance in F . 10 A more modern and lucid exposition of this result can be found in Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012, Section 2.3).
(ii) if a problem instance is drawn from some distribution over F , any algorithm incurs high expected regret.
(iii) any algorithm incurs high regret on every problem instance in F , perhaps under some assumption on the algorithm.
Form (ii) is stronger than (i). Form (iii) without any assumption is stronger than (ii). The two most known lower bounds are the √ T bound from Auer et al. (2002b) and the instance-dependent constant times log(T ) bound from Lai and Robbins (1985) ; they are in the form (ii) and (iii), respectively. The Lai-Robbins lower bound has a weaker but more lucid corollary in the form (i).
In all bandit lower bounds that we are aware of, the construction of the family F tends to be quite simple and intuitive, whereas the actual regret bound is obtained by a lengthy and intricate mathematical analysis based on KL-divergence. Thus, when proving a new lower regret bound it is very desirable to reduce it to an existing one rather than derive it from first principles.
Additional difficulties in Bayesian Exploration. Connecting Bayesian Exploration to the LaiRobbins lower bound is subtle, for several reasons.
First, we'd like a lower bound for the same benchmark as the upper bound in Theorem 3.3, i.e., for OPT(Π δ ), whereas the bandit lower bound is relative to the best fixed action. While in Bayesian Exploration some actions might not be explorable, we use the tools from Mansour et al. (2015) to argue that all actions are explorable in the problem instances that we focus on. Moreover, the benchmark OPT(Π δ ) is about δ-BIC policies, δ > 0, whereas the results from Mansour et al. (2015) are only about δ = 0 as stated. We need to be careful with our assumptions so as to observe that the technique from Mansour et al. (2015) yields in δ-BIC policies, for any sufficiently small δ. In the end, we conclude that OPT(Π δ ) equals the best-fixed-action benchmark (5).
Second, the Lai-Robbins lower bound includes a non-trivial assumption that, essentially, the algorithm's regret is not too high. So, the lower bound for Bayesian Exploration should either include a similar assumption explicitly, or derive it inside the proof (we accomplish the latter). Moreover, while a policy for Bayesian Exploration can be seen as a bandit algorithm, in Bayesian Exploration the algorithm inputs a prior, whereas in the Lai-Robbins lower bound it doesn't. In particular, the Lai-Robbins machinery immediately applies only when the prior is fixed. In order to resolve these difficulties and apply the Lai-Robbins lower bound after all, we focus on a carefully constructed instance of Bayesian Exploration, and formulate a non-standard version of Lai-Robbins whose proof is implicit in Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012, Section 2.3).
Formulation and proof
We focus on a relatively simple special case of Bayesian Exploration for which the techniques from Mansour et al. (2015) and Lai and Robbins (1985) can be usefully applied. 
for any δ ∈ (0, δ 0 ).
Proof. Fix a two-by-three problem instance, let U denote its utility structure. Since the two actions have distinct prior mean rewards, without loss of generality assume that E[u(a 1 )] > E[u(a 2 )].
It is easy to see that this problem instance satisfies the following property. Let S k be the the random variable representing the first k rewards received from action a 1 . Let
There exist constants k U , τ U , ρ U > 0, possibly depending on U , Mansour et al. (2015, Section 4) proved that with this property, both actions are eventually explorable. Moreover, they provided a BIC policy which explores both actions at least k times, for any given k, and terminates at some round T = T k,U determined by the k and the utility structure. Let us extend this policy by one more round, so that in the last round it recommends an arm with a highest posterior mean reward. It is easy to verify that this extended policy is in fact δ-BIC for any δ ∈ (0, δ U ) and k > k ′ U , for some constants δ U and k ′ U that are determined by the utility structure. Let f (k) be the Bayesian-expected reward of this policy in the last round, as a function of parameter k. It is easy to see that f (k) → B U as k → ∞.
We consider iterative recommendation policies π that run indefinitely, without a built-in time horizon. In light of Lemma 8.3, we focus on regret with respect to the best-fixed-action benchmark. For technical convenience, we define it here for each round t and before taking the expectation over the prior: 
To prove Theorem 8.4, we make a connection to a basic model of multi-armed bandits in which there are only two actions a 1 , a 2 , the reward of each action a is a Bernoulli random variable with a fixed but unknown expectation µ(a), and no Bayesian prior is available to the algorithm. Henceforth, we refer to this model as Basic Bandits. An instance of Basic Bandits is specified by the mean rewards µ(a 1 ), µ(a 2 ). Any iterative recommendation policy for a two-by-three instance can be interpreted as an algorithm for Basic Bandits.
We use a non-standard version of the Lai-Robbins lower bound, stated below. It is implicit in the proof of the standard version, as presented in Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012, Section 2.3).
Theorem 8.5 (Lai and Robbins (1985) ; Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) 
where C is an absolute constant and t 0 can depend on the problem instance.
Proof of Theorem 8.4. Fix an iterative recommendation policy π, BIC or not. Pick ν as in Theorem 8.5. Fix a two-by-three problem instance I with support {ν, ν 1 , ν 2 } and prior probabilities as in (23). For the sake of contradiction, suppose policy π does not satisfy the lower bound (24) for this problem instance. Then, letting c 0 = 1/|ν 1 − ν 2 |, for some time t 0 it holds that E[R(t)] ≤ O(c 0 log t) for any time t > t 0 (where the O() notation hides absolute constants). It follows that policy π satisfies this upper bound for any instance of Basic Bandits with mean rewards in {ν, ν 1 , ν 2 }. Then by Theorem 8.5 policy π suffers the lower bound (26) for the instance of Basic Bandits with mean rewards µ(a 1 ) = ν 1 and µ(a 2 ) = ν 2 . This instance occurs with constant probability with respect to the prior in I , which implies the desired lower bound (24).
Conclusions and open questions
We introduce a model which captures incentivizing exploration in Bayesian games, and resolve the first-order issues in this model: explorability and constant/logarithmic regret. Our policies are computationally efficient: the per-round running time is polynomial in the input size under a generic game representation.
We make several simplifying assumptions in order to arrive at a tractable model. We believe this is a fundamental model which should be studied first, both for immediate use and to ground and inform subsequent work on richer models. In what follows, we discuss some of the simplifying assumptions in more detail, and outline the corresponding directions for future work.
First, we assume that the game does not change over time, even though there is a fresh set of agents in each round. A more realistic model would have each agent identified by "context", such as source-destination pair in the traffic routing example, and allow the tuple of agents' contexts to change from one round to another. Then we (still) have a parameterized game matrix that the principal wishes to learn, but the parametrization is now by states and contexts. Absent BIC restriction, this is special case of "contextual bandits", a generalization of multi-armed bandits that is well-studied in machine learning (see Agarwal et al., 2014 , and references therein). Extending Bayesian Exploration to a model with contexts would be parallel to extending from multi-armed bandits to contextual bandits in the machine learning literature. In fact, such extension has been accomplished in Mansour et al. (2015) for the special case of a single agent per round.
Second, we adopt the state-of-art solution concept of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and assume that all agents follow recommendations once the BIC property holds. Whereas this solution concept is not ideal: in practice some agents may deviate. Robustness to a small fraction of deviating agents is a desirable extension. It is worth noting that deviating agents (esp. randomly deviating agents) provide some exploration "for free"; however, our approach does not rely on such "free exploration", and works even if it is absent.
Third, following much of the literature in theoretical economics, we assume that the principal can commit to a particular policy. Such "power of commitment" is known to be tremendously useful in many scenarios. One wonders whether one can extend Bayesian Exploration to the "world without commitment". One would probably need to start with the very basic model (such as a single agent per round, only two actions, and deterministic rewards, as in Kremer et al. (2014) ), and even then the problem is likely to be very challenging.
There is also a major simplifying assumption that we do not make: we do not assume that the game matrix has a succinct representation, e.g., via an (unknown) low-dimensional parameter vector. More generally, we do not make any "inference assumptions" that would allow one to infer something about the rewards of one joint action from the rewards of other actions. 11 Absent such "inference assumptions", exploring all explorable joint actions is typically necessary to optimize the recommendation policy, and computation must take time polynomial in the size of the game matrix. Whereas a succinct game representation may potentially allow for must faster exploration and/or computation. One concrete goal is to make the number of rounds polynomial in the size of the succinct representation, and achieve a similar improvement for the per-round running time. A simultaneous paper (Dughmi and Xu, 2016 ) addresses a similar question for the running time of solving the Bayesian Persuasion game.
